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Abstract: Based on historical review of the Chinese rural land policy from 1950 to 1978, we 
looked back the devious journey undergone in Chinese rural areas during this period. At first, the 
landlord’s ownership was transferred into the peasant’s ownership; and then private ownership was 
transferred into public ownership. The radical transformation of property right and process of 
agricultural cooperation went against the economic law and the wills of the mass peasants, which 
led to laggard rural productive forces and long-term low peasants’ income level. During the policy 
transformation process, political and ideological factors played the predominant role, which led to 
harmful results. The experiences in this period demonstrated that the economic developmental 
model and systematic arrangement in Chinese rural areas should satisfy the peasants’ free wills and 
protect the peasants’ essential interests. Only in this way could the Chinese rural economy gain fast 
development. 
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Abstrait: Basés sur une révision historique de la politique de terre dans les régions rurales de Chine 
de 1950 à 1978, nous avons mené un examen rétrospectif sur le parcours détourné qu’avaient 
traversé ces régions pendant cette période. Au début, les terres des propriétaires fonciers avaient été 
transférées comme propriétés des paysans ; et puis, les propriétés privées avaient été transféré 
comme propriétés publiques. La transformation radicale du droit de propriété et le processus de la 
coopération agricole après la réforme de terre allaient à l’encontre de la loi économique et de la 
volonté des paysans, ce qui avait conduit à un retard des forces productives dans les régions rurales 
et à un niveau de revenu très inférieur pour les paysans chinois. Dans ce processus de 
transformation de politiques, les facteurs politiques et idéologiques avaient joué un rôle 
prédominant, d’où des résultats défavorables. Les expériences que nous avons tirées pendant cette 
période montrent bien que le modèle du développement économique et l’arrangement systématique 
dans les régions rurales de Chine doivent satisfaire la volonté des paysans et protéger leurs intérêts 
fondamentaux. C’est aussi le seul moyen qui permette aux régions rurales de Chine de réaliser un 
développement rapide.  
Mots Clés: Régions Rurales de Chine, Politique de Terre, Transformation Systématique, 
Idéologie,Intérêts 
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1.  PREFACE 
 
The issue of land policy in Chinese rural areas is a 
complex one. In this article, we divided land policy 
evolvement in Chinese rural areas into 3 periods 
according to its development from 1950 to 1978. 
(1) The land reform period (1950-1952).  
(2) The agricultural cooperation period 
(1952-1958).  
(3) The people’s commune period (1958-1978).  
Based on history review of the rural land policies, 
we studied the rural systematic transformations during 
these periods and found out that essential changes took 
place in the aspects of land ownership, land usufruct and 
land management system. We analyzed the reasons for 
the policy evolvement from 1950 to 1978 and its 
political, economic and social influences on Chinese 
rural areas. 
The systematic evolvement which took place from 
1950 to 1978 was forcefully implemented by national 
governmental policies. As Mr. Zhang Hongyu, a 
Chinese scholar said, “Enforcement was once the 
primary character of the rural systematic arrangement in 
China”. (zhang Hongyu, 2002，p.40) 
 From 1950 to 1952, the national government 
changed the landlord’s ownership into the peasant’s 
ownership by land reform policies and realized the goal 
of “whoever cultivates possesses his own land”, which 
led to great changes of economic and political relations 
in Chinese rural areas.  
The elementary producers’ cooperative period from 
1953 to 1956 was the interim of the second systematic 
transformation in Chinese rural society. Although 
private land ownership was theoretically granted and 
the peasants got their membership in the agricultural 
producers’ cooperative by sharing their means of 
production, the transformation of land usufruct and 
strict restriction of the members’ private plots had 
already made property right relation inordinate. Started 
from 1956, Chinese rural areas stepped into the second 
systematic transformation period, in which the peasant’s 
land ownership was changed into the collective land 
ownership. From 1956 to 1958, under the direction of 
the national ideological mainstream and the agricultural 
cooperation policy, Chinese rural areas fastened and 
finally completed the transformations of property right 
structure and property right relationship. The systematic 
arrangement and managing way of “partnership and 
equal output” was realized. In 1958, Chinese rural areas 
came into the people’s commune period. During this 
period, “integration of government administration with 
commune management ”was implemented in political 
life and “one large and two collectivizations” was 
carried out in economic life. “One large” meant the 
scale of the productive organization was large; the “two 
collectivizations” referred to the expropriation of the 
peasants’ means of production and part of their means of 
livelihood. The socialistic public ownership went to its 
extremity and the economic development in Chinese 
rural areas also went to a close, rivalless, and long-term 
laggard period. 
This article analyzed China’s rural land policy and 
its systematic changes from 1950 to 1978 by historical, 
political and policy study methods. It summarized the 
political and economic development of Chinese rural 
areas before 1978 and drew its experiences and lessons. 
Also, it provided evidence for the necessity and 
rationality of the policy adjustments and systematic 
transformations in the Chinese rural areas after 1978 
from a historic and experimental perspective. 
 
2.  THE LAND REFORM PERIOD 
(1950-1952)         
 
Background of the land reform 
2.1 Conditions of Chinese Rural Land 
System before 1949 
Before 1949, the landlord’s ownership was practiced 
and the landlord economy system predominated in the 
Chinese rural areas. There was much irrationality in 
land ownership, land usufruct and land management 
power, which was reflected with the following aspects. 
2.1.1 Rural Lands Were Highly Centralized 
On June 14th 1950, Liu Shaoqi gave a report on the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’s 
(CPPCC) Second Meeting of the First National 
Conference. In his “Report on the Problems of the Land 
Reform”, he mentioned, “The landlords and kulaks, 
who account for less than 10% of the rural population, 
occupy 70% to 80% of the rural lands, thus they exploit 
the peasants ruthlessly. On the other hand, the poor 
peasants, farm laborers, middle peasants and other 
laborers, who account for more than 90% of the rural 
population, occupy only 20% to 30% of the lands. They 
toil all the year round without enough to eat and wear.” 
(Central Committee’s Documents Research Institute, 
Vol. 1, p.290-291) After the People’s Republic of China 
was founded, the National Statistical Bureau and some 
history scholars made a statistical account on the land 
possession conditions before 1949. A history scholar, 
Guo Dehong came to a conclusion after his studies, 
“The landlords and kulaks, who account for 9. 43% of 
the total rural households and 11.55% of the total rural 
population occupied 50.64% of the total lands. The 
middle peasants, poor peasants, farm laborers and other 
laborers, who account for 90.66% of the total rural 
households and 88.41% of the total rural population, 
occupied 48.03% of the total lands.（Guo Dehong，
1989） 
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Economic historian Zhu Yuxiang made a conclusion 
after synthesizing various researches that in the past, the 
landlords and kulaks, who accounted for 10% of the 
rural population, occupied more than 50% of the rural 
lands. While the poor peasants, farm laborers, middle 
peasants and other laborers, who accounted for more 
than 90% of the rural population, occupied less than half 
of the lands. In some areas of southern China, the land 
centralization phenomenon was even more serious. The 
landlords and kulaks occupied 70%-80% of the rural 
lands, and the lands they owned were of the best quality. 
While the middle peasants, poor peasants and farm 
laborers’ lands were mostly coarse lands. （ Zhu 
Yuxiang，1997，P36） From these facts we can see that 
the high-level land centralization phenomenon before 
1949 was a big problem in Chinese rural areas. 
2.1.2 Land Ownership and Land Usufruct Were 
Obviously Separated 
Under the landlord’s ownership, the landlords and 
kulaks occupied more than 50% of the rural lands, with 
only 10% to 40% cultivated by themselves. (Zhu 
Yuxiang, p.73)On the other hand, the middle peasants, 
farm laborers and poor peasants cultivated 60% to 90% 
of the rural lands but most of the lands didn’t belong to 
themselves. There came up the phenomenon of “those 
who cultivate lands have no lands; while those who own 
lands do not cultivate lands”, (Zhu Yuxiang, p.73)which 
showed the obvious separation of land ownership and 
land cultivation. 
2.1.3 The Rural Economic Relationship was 
Irrational. 
Under the economic system of the landlord’s ownership, 
the tenant-peasants were economically connected with 
the landlords by tenancy. Taking advantage of the lands 
they owned, the landlords extracted high land rents from 
the poor peasants, which occupied about 50% of the 
total tenancy output. It was once said that “when the 
whole year’s output came out, the landlords got half and 
the cultivators got half.” In some areas, the landlords got 
70% or even 100% of the peasants’ whole year’s 
outcome. (Zhang Chaozun, 1991, p.39) In many areas, 
the landlords forced the peasants to submit additional 
rent, preliminary rent, and bonded rent besides the land 
rent. Sometimes they even bore corvée and taxes. 
Furthermore, the peasants were forced to give unpaid 
labor to the landlords or serve in their houses. Heavy 
land rents and exorbitant levies set the peasants in 
extreme misery and they were penniless. From 1929 to 
1932, approximately 17.7 million peasants were starved 
to death all over China. From 1946 to 1947, only in 
three provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong and Hunan, 
17.5 million peasants were starved to death. (Zhang 
Chaozun, p.40) 
The land system before 1949 seriously restricted the 
development of rural productive forces, which caused 
slow productivity and severe land desolation. Only in 
1946, 58 million mu (1mu = 0.0667 hectares) of land 
were laid waste in Henan, Hunan and Guangdong 
provinces altogether. There was big decrease in both 
total output and unit outcome of crops. (Zhang 
Yongquan, 1985, p.45) 
The laggard rural productive forces and needy living 
conditions in the rural areas before 1949 was the 
primary motivation for the outcome of the land reform 
policy in 1950.  
 
2.2 Policy Program of the Chinese 
Communist Party 
The Chinese Communist Party always regarded solving 
land problems as her main task to rescue the poor 
peasants and develop rural productive forces. As early 
as in the Chinese revolutionary war period (The Chinese 
revolutionary war period is from the 1920s to the 1940s. 
It includes the Land Revolutionary War, the 
Anti-Japanese War and the Liberation War under the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party), the 
Chinese Communist Party had tried various kinds of 
rural land policies to stimulate the peasants’ producing 
enthusiasm and push forward rural economy. The land 
reform policy after 1949 was the extension of her rural 
land policy in the past to a large extent. It was an 
important part of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
program of new democratic revolution. It was also one 
of her policy measures to consolidate the new regime 
and get involved in the economic realm. (Feng Kaiwen, 
1999) 
2.2.1 Contents of the Land Reform Policy 
In June, 1950, the Chinese Communist Party held the 
Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee and 
passed the resolution of implementing land reform all 
over the country. The central government of People’s 
Republic of China promulgated “the Land Reform Law 
of People’s Republic of China”, “the Organizing 
Statutes of Peasant Associations”, “A Decision on 
Classifying Rural Classes” and “the Land Reform 
Statutes of Towns and Suburbs”. These ordinances 
definitely prescribed the guideline, route and specifics 
of the land reform, which became the guidance of the 
land reform. 
The “Land Reform Law” stipulated that the aims for 
the land reform were “to abolish the landlord’s land 
ownership of feudalistic exploitation; carry out the 
peasant’s land ownership; release rural productive 
forces; develop rural production and open up the way 
for the industrialization of new China.” (Central 
Committee’s Documents Research Institute，1992，No.1, 
p.336) 
The specific contents of the land reform were as 
follows: 
First, confiscating the landlords’ lands, maintaining 
the property of the rich peasants and protecting the 
interests of the middle peasants.   
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The “Land Reform Law” prescribed that the 
landlords’ lands; farm animals; farm tools; redundant 
foodstuff and their superfluous houses in the 
countryside be expropriated. But all the other properties 
could be maintained. The kulaks’ self-cultivated and 
employee-cultivated lands and other properties were 
protected from encroachment. The middle peasants’ 
lands, including the rich middle peasants’ lands and 
other properties were protected from being encroached. 
Second, realizing the peasant’s land ownership 
The “Land Reform Law” prescribed that all the 
expropriated lands and means of production be taken 
over by the peasant associations and distributed among 
the peasants who had no lands or were lack of means of 
production. But the ones that were prescribed to be 
turned over to the state according to the “Land Reform 
Law of the People’s Republic of China” could be 
reserved. The distribution of lands was practiced with 
township or administrative villages which were equal to 
township as its basic unit. Based on previous farming 
lands, the lands were distributed by quantity, quality and 
location. Also they were transferred and adjusted 
according to rural population. The former landlords also 
got their shares. After the land reform, the peasants 
became land owners. The government issued land 
ownership certificate to the peasants and admitted the 
land owners’ free management, trade and lease of their 
lands. 
2.2.2 Effects and Evaluation of the Land 
Reform Policy 
2.2.2.1Results of the Land Reform 
The rural land reform after 1950 changed the landlord’s 
land ownership to the peasant’s land ownership. At the 
end of 1952, the land reform in the newly liberated areas 
(note: liberated areas: the areas that were occupied by 
the Chinese Communist Party) came to an end. 
Combined with former liberated areas, about 300 
million peasants who had few or no lands before the 
land reform got 700 million mu (note: 700 million mu 
(畝 ) equals to about 115 million acres) of land 
altogether. Also, they were exempted from heavy land 
rents which were required by the landlords annually. 
The peasants got their own live stocks; farm tools; 
houses and foodstuff. (Lin Yunhui, 1989, p.127) 
The land reform made the cultivator possess their 
own lands, which aroused the peasants’ producing 
enthusiasm greatly. The peasants then worked day and 
night, launching a patriotic movement to increase 
production. In the winter of 1950, over 98 thousand 
ponds, 22.5 thousand dykes, 4139 kilometer-long canals 
and 1940 ditches were constructed only in Hunan 
province. More than 7.5 million mu of land benefited 
from these activities. (Lin Yunhui, 1989, p.130) Rural 
economy was dramatically recovered and developed. 
Compared with 1949, the total value of agricultural 
production was increased by 48.5% by the end of 1952. 
From 1949 to 1952, the total output of foodstuff was 
increased by degrees of 29.8% each year. During this 
period, the total output of cotton was increased by 
degrees of 134.8% each year. (Zhang Chaozun, 
p.40)The peasants’ living was greatly improved. 
2.2.2.2 Evaluation of the Land Reform Policy 
The implementation of land reform policy from 1950 to 
1952 was the first rural systematic transformation since 
People’s Republic of China was founded. The 
landlord’s ownership was transferred into the peasant’s 
ownership by governmental power. (Feng Kaiwen) 
Some scholars thus described the land reform 
movement as a “revolution”. (Zhang Hongyu, p.41) 
The land reform policy was economically beneficial 
to the tenant-peasants. The Chinese Communist Party 
changed the landlord’s ownership to the peasant’s 
ownership by governmental force, which met with the 
vast poor peasants’ wills and interests. The peasants got 
their own share of land and obtained their living 
insurance, thus this policy was warmly supported and 
welcomed by them. The poor peasants and middle 
peasants were greatly inspired by the policy, which 
promoted the development of rural economy. 
The land reform policy clearly regulated that kulak 
economy be maintained and that middle peasants be 
protected. The kulak economy was the capitalistic 
economy in rural areas. Since it had relatively strong 
throughput, maintaining kulak economy was beneficial 
to the development of rural productive forces and 
recovery of national economy. Also, maintenance of 
kulak economy was good for making kulaks keep 
neutral during the land reform, which could better 
protect the middle peasants and eliminate their concerns 
on production and development. It made their hearts at 
ease and strengthened their confidence of further 
development and production, which was beneficial to 
the stability of rural society. (Cheng Tongshun, 2000, 
p.11) 
The Chinese Communist Party’s land reform policy 
rearranged land resources and set up a more “fair” 
society, which satisfied the poor peasants’ strong desires 
for lands. “New relationship between the government 
and the peasants was established. The new regime not 
only strengthened its control over the peasants, but also 
expanded and solidified its foundation in the rural 
areas”. (Zhang Hongyu, p.41) Therefore, the land 
reform from 1950 to 1952 was not only an economic 
transformation, but also a political movement. 
 
3.  THE AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATION PERIOD              
（1952—1958）                                         
3.1 Background for the Outcome of the 
Agricultural Cooperation Policy 
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3.1.1 New Conditions after the Land Reform 
After the land reform, there appeared two trends in the 
rural areas. First, the rural production relation was 
adjusted and rural production was greatly promoted. 
The living conditions of former middle peasants and 
rich middle peasants were continuously improved. The 
former poor peasants and farm laborers got free lands 
and their living conditions were also improved. Second, 
the ‘polarization’ phenomena appeared after the land 
reform. Some of the peasants became rich within a short 
time. They bought lands, employed laborers and 
enlarged their management scale. These people became 
the “neo-kulaks”. However, a small part of the rural 
households were bogged down due to a series of reasons 
such as being short of funds and producing tools, natural 
disasters, or being not able to manage their lands well. 
Thus they had to sell their lands or borrow money to live 
from hand to mouth. 
3.1.2 To Realize Socialistic Modernization Was 
the Vested Goal of the Chinese Communist 
Party  
   To realize socialistic modernization was not only the 
established goal of the Chinese Communist Party, but 
also the deep-seated reason for the implementation of 
the agricultural cooperation policy after 1952. After the 
land reform, although the peasants’ producing and 
living conditions were improved, the general economic 
situation of the rural areas was not optimistic. The rural 
land management was based on household, which was 
small-scale and lack of funds. The average amount of 
money one rural household could afford to buy 
producing tools in one year was 3.5 yuan RMB. (Cheng 
Tongshun, p.15) The peasants’ producing tools were 
rough and they were starving for live stocks and farm 
tools. The independent farming method based on the 
household unit made the peasants unable to construct 
irrigation and water conservancies. Thus the peasants’ 
abilities to withstand natural disasters were rather weak. 
According to the survey on 15432 rural households in 
23 provinces after the land reform, the average 
occupation of means of production per household is as 
follows. (See Table 1)  
The development of industry required agricultural 
support in funds, market, farm produces and labor force. 
However, after the land reform the level of rural 
productive forces was still quite laggard. Few farm 
produces were left surplus and their commodity 
exchange rate was rather low. According to the survey 
on 13245 households from 18 provinces in 1955, the 
average commodity exchange rate of each rural 
household’s farm produces was only 25.7%. The 
highest rate of the rich households was no more than 
43.1%. (Tong Dalin, 1956, p.23)) The lagging rural 
development condition showed that agriculture was not 
able to support industrial development. 
Faced with the trend of rural “polarization” and the 
demand from industry, the Chinese Communist Party 
decided to change production relations gradually, adjust 
land ownership and land usufruct, and organize the 
peasants to carry out the agricultural cooperation policy 
in order to develop rural productive forces and promote 
industrial accumulation. In Sep. 1951, “The Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China’s Decision 
on the Implementation of mutual Cooperation in Rural 
Production (Draft)” pointed out, “In order to overcome 
the difficulties in separate management; in order to help 
the poor peasants rapidly increase their production and 
gain ample food and clothing; in order to help our 
country obtain much more commercial foodstuff and 
industrial raw materials than we do now; in order to 
enhance the peasants’ purchasing power and make our 
country’s industrial products more salable, we must 
‘organize’ …… and stimulate the peasants’ enthusiasm 
in mutual cooperation. Such kind of mutual cooperation 
was practiced by collective laboring based on the 
peasants’ private estates, and its developmental 
foreground was agricultural collectivism or 
socialization.” (Central Committee’s Documents 
Research Institute, Vol. 1, p.510) 
 
3.2 Controversies among the Chinese 
Communist Party’s Leadership 
In the early 1950s, the leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party had vehement controversies about 
agricultural cooperation and how long it should take to 
transfer from private ownership to collectivization. The 
focus of the controversy was whether or not to turn into 
socialism immediately after the land reform.  
Some of the leaders, with Liu Shaoqi as their 
representative thought that first of all, the 
neo-democratism was a long-term course. The peasants’ 
private ownership shouldn’t be easily waved, weakened 
or negated. Kulak economy should be granted and 
capitalism within the rural areas should be developed. 
Second, considering the relationship between 
industrialization and agricultural cooperation, 
agricultural cooperation couldn’t be realized until 
industrialization was accomplished. Only when rural 
productive forces and state industrialization were 
developed to a certain degree could socialistic rural 
collectivization be carried out under the free wills of the 
peasants. (Liu Yong, 2001, p.174-175) However, some 
of the leaders, with Mao Zedong as their representative 
thought that kulak economy should be limited and 
socialism could be realized by “new productive forces 
which came out of collective management and that 
private ownership would be waved by socialism”. (Liu 
Yong, p.176-177) 
At the end of this controversy, Mao won out. On Dec. 
15th, 1951, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China passed the strategic design for carrying 
out socialistic construction in the rural areas, that was, 
to take a direct transformation to socialism after the land 
reform by the route of the mutual aid group to the 
elementary agricultural producers’ cooperative to the 
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advanced agricultural producers’ cooperative, without 
undergoing the long term neo-democratism   
construction period from modern industrialization to 
agricultural collectivism to socialism. (Central 
Committee’s Documents Research Institute, Vol. 1, 
p.510-522) 
 
3.3 Policy Contents and Effects of the 
Agricultural Cooperation Period 
3.3.1 Policy Contents and Effects of the Mutual 
Aid Group Period (1951-1953) 
The mutual aid group period was from Dec. 1951 to Nov. 
1953. The mutual aid group was a type of simple 
cooperative group in which rural households carried out 
independent management. The lands, live stocks, and 
other kinds of means of production were privately 
owned and the farm produces belonged to the land 
owners. There were two kinds of mutual aid group: 
temporary group and permanent group. Mutual 
cooperation was realized by public usage of labor force, 
live stocks and farm tools under the rule of equivalent 
exchange to conquer the difficulties existed in 
dispersive individual management.  
Although the mutual cooperation group was the 
Chinese Communist Party’s transitional form of 
realizing socialistic target in the rural areas, the basic 
systems of the peasant’s land ownership and the 
family-based land management were not changed 
during the mutual cooperation period. Lands, farm tools 
and other kinds of means of production or produces still 
belonged to the peasants themselves. The distribution of 
farm produces were connected with land ownership and 
labor quantity the members provided. Mutual 
cooperation was based upon the peasants’ free wills, 
thus it was accepted by the peasants. 
The establishment of mutual aid group mitigated the 
problems of labor force and producing funds within 
individual household management and helped some 
poor peasants solve the difficulties in production, which 
led to improved output and private incomes of the 
peasants. (See Table 2 and table 3) The mutual 
cooperation group developed very fast. From 1951 to 
the end of 1952, the number of rural mutual aid group 
increased from 4.08 million to 80.26 million. The 
number of participated household increased from 21 
million to 453.64 million. (Chen Tingxuan) 
3.3.2 Policy Contents and Effects of the 
Elementary Agricultural Producers’ 
Cooperative Period (1953-1956) 
3.3.2.1 Background of the Policy 
In the early 1950s, with the beginning of the planned 
large-scale economic construction, the contradictory 
between industrial construction demand and 
agricultural production supply, especially foodstuff 
supply became more and more severe. The Chinese 
Communist Party then put forward the policies of state 
monopoly for purchase and marketing of farm produces 
to guarantee industrial demand for farm produces. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party began to 
consider fastening the process of adjusting rural 
production relationship in order to fundamentally meet 
the demand of industrialization. Thus the process of 
transformation from mutual aid group to elementary 
agricultural producers’ cooperative was started and the 
steps towards agricultural cooperation were fastened. 
Faced with the conflict between foodstuff supply 
and industrial demand, Mao Zedong thought that 
dispersive laggard individual agriculture was not able to 
resolve the vital foodstuff problem, which was 
concerned with national economy and people's 
livelihood. He emphasized that production relationship 
should be changed and that private ownership should be 
transferred into public ownership to realize socialism 
and promote the development of productive forces. 
Only in this way could the conflict between supply and 
demand be settled. (Mao Zedong, 1977, Vol. 5, p.117, 
120) 
3.3.2.2 Policy Contents 
In Oct. and Nov. of 1953, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China passed the “Decision on the 
Implementation of Planned-Purchase and 
Planned-Supply of Foodstuff” (The Central 
Committee’s Documents Press, 1993, vol.4, p.477-488) 
and “The Government Administration Council’s Order 
on the Implementation of Planned-Purchase and 
Planned-Supply of Foodstuff”. (The Central 
Committee’s Documents Press, 1993, Vol.4, p.561-564) 
These two documents prescribed that the peasants must 
sell their harvest to the state according to certain 
quantity, variety and price set by the government, which 
was called “requisition by purchase”. If it happened to 
be a poor harvest year or the government purchased too 
much foodstuff so that the peasants couldn’t feed 
themselves, then the government would take the 
circumstances into consideration and sell the state 
treasury stored foodstuff to the peasants, which was 
called “reselling to the place of production”. 
With respect to land ownership, private land 
ownership was admitted and the peasants committed 
their shares by confiscating their means of production, 
such as lands and farm tools. The land usufruct 
belonged to the cooperative. The cooperative members 
were allowed to keep private plots, but the acreage per 
member owned couldn’t supersede 5% of the total 
average acreage of the whole villagers. With respect to 
producing management, the elementary cooperative 
carried out the systems of unitive management and 
collective laboring. Job contract was put into effect 
within the production team. The production team 
managed a fixed amount of lands and dominated a fixed 
number of producing tools. Under the guidance of the 
elementary cooperative’s producing plan, each 
production team arranged their producing plan 
 6 
Tan Rong, Gao Huake, Cui Jie /Canadian Social Science Vol.1 No.1 2005 1-21 
according to their own conditions. The elementary 
cooperative made a unitive distribution of products 
under the rules of “distribution according to work load” 
and “profit sharing according to share”. 
3.3.2.3 Policy Adjustment  
The elementary agricultural producers’ cooperative took 
an immoderate development in the winter of 1954 and 
spring of 1955. In some areas, people were aroused to 
precipitate establishing the elementary cooperative 
against the tenet of free will and mutual benefit, which 
led to panic and dissatisfaction among the peasants. In 
1954, the central government over levied 3.5 billion 
kilogram so-called “surplus grain” from the peasants in 
non-disaster areas, (Lin Yunhui, p.242) which seriously 
encroached the peasants’ interests and led to various 
degrees of tension within the rural areas. In a certain 
province, 111 peasants committed suicide because of 
the forceful foodstuff purchasing. (Lin Yunhui, p.537) 
In many areas, peasants began to slaughter batches of 
pigs and cows and sell their livestock, which severely 
affected rural production.  
In order to solve these problems, the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China adjusted 
the policy and put forward the three-word guideline of 
“pause, withdraw and develop”, (Lin Yunhui, p.545) 
which was the policy of pausing development, making 
appropriate constringency and resuming development 
according to different conditions in different areas.  
3.3.2.4 Policy Analysis 
The elementary agricultural producers’ cooperative was 
the beginning of China’s agricultural cooperation 
process. Also, it started the second systematic 
transformation in the rural areas after the land reform. 
Although it theoretically granted private land ownership, 
the change of land usufruct and land management 
indicated that the relationship of property right had 
already been blurred. The Chinese rural land system 
was transferring from the peasant’s ownership into the 
collective ownership. 
Since mutual cooperation on base of the peasant’s 
interests and free wills was encouraged during the early 
period of the elementary cooperative, there were some 
active achievements in producing performance. In the 
earliest 1 or 2 years, the elementary cooperatives 
increased their production by 20% to 30%. (See Table 4) 
(Bo Yibo, 1991, p.326, 343) However, generally 
speaking, although the elementary cooperative 
enhanced the poor and lower-middle peasants’ income, 
it reduced the rich peasants’ income. (See Tale 5) 
Although distribution according to work and land 
reward was combined in product distribution, which 
gave attention to the interests of the rich peasants who 
had more lands, the blurriness of property right still 
harmed their interests in general. The impetuous rash 
advance during the cooperation process also violated 
the peasants’ free wills of mutual benefit, which brought 
dissatisfaction from the interest-harmed peasants. Still, 
due to the numerous peasants’ faith, support and 
dependence on the Chinese Communist Party after the 
land reform and the Communist Party’s ideological 
indoctrination, the elementary agricultural producers’ 
cooperative gained development despite some 
problems. 
3.3.3 Policy Contents and Effects during the 
Transformation to the Advanced Agricultural 
Producers’ Period (1956-1958) 
3.3.3.1 Policy Background 
In the spring of 1955, the Central Rural Working 
Department began to rectify the elementary cooperative 
according to the policy of “pause, withdraw and 
develop” under the guidance of Deng Zihui. However, 
Mao Zedong changed his attitude and criticized the 
constringency endeavors. He emphasized that the 
elementary cooperative should be greatly developed, 
which led to a controversy among the central leaders. 
Deng Zihui pointed out that the administrative 
command style within the elementary cooperative’s 
developmental process was against the principle of free 
will and mutual benefit. The main reasons for the 
intense situation in the rural areas were agricultural 
cooperation, monopoly purchase and selling of 
foodstuff and reform on private ownership. Also, he 
said that it was meaningless to implement large-scale 
production without realizing mechanization first. 
However, Mao Zedong argued that the intense situation 
in the rural areas was a reflection of the rich and 
rich-middle peasants’ resist to socialism. He said, “In 
recent years, a spontaneous force of capitalism within 
the rural areas developed day by day. Neo-rich peasants 
showed up everywhere. Many rich-middle peasants are 
striving to become rich peasants.…… If we let this 
tendency continue, the polarization phenomena within 
the rural areas will become more and more serious”. He 
thought that this problem could only be settled by 
agricultural cooperation. (Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, p.187) 
Also, he insisted the necessity of industrialization’s 
demand from agricultural cooperation. He claimed that 
“the problems grown out of agricultural cooperation 
could be basically settled within 3 five-year plan 
periods ……” (Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, p.181-182) and 
criticized that Deng Zihui and some other comrades 
were making a “right opportunism” mistake. 
Under the advocacy of Mao Zedong, the agricultural 
cooperation process went to its climax under the clamor 
of anti-“right opportunism”. By May 1956, the total 
amount of households that participated in the 
agricultural producers’ cooperative reached 11013, 
which occupied 91.2% of the total households in rural 
China. Among them, those who participated in the 
advanced agricultural producers’ cooperative occupied 
61.9% of the total household amount. (Lin Yunhui, 
p.576) By the end of 1956, this number became 87.7% 
and reached 96% in 1957. (Cong, Jin, 1989, p.68) The 
transformation which was supposed to take 3 five-year 
plan periods according to the original plan came out to 
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be finished within only 4 years. 
3.3.3.2 Policy Contents 
The transformation from the elementary cooperative to 
the advanced cooperative was another rural systematic 
transformation after the land reform. With respect to the 
ownership of means of production, the cooperative 
members’ primary producing materials became public 
property of the advanced agricultural producers’ 
cooperative according to the principle of socialism. 
When the advanced cooperative expropriate farm 
animals, large-scale farm tools and other tools which 
formerly belonged to the cooperative members but were 
not in use when managing family sidelines, their price 
should be decided according to the local conditions and 
paid to their previous owners by stages. Private plots 
were allowed. 
With respect to management system, producing 
responsibility and collective laboring were practiced. 
Production team was the basic laboring unit of the 
advanced agricultural producers’ cooperative, which 
was in charge of certain amount of lands, farm animals 
and farm tools. Production contracts and overfulfillment 
encouragement were allowed within the production 
teams.  
With respect to distribution system, land reward was 
abolished and products were distributed by the 
advanced agricultural producers’ cooperative according 
to the cooperative members’ work. 
3.3.3.3 The Problems 
During the transformation from the elementary 
agricultural producers’ cooperative to the advanced 
agricultural producers’ cooperative, lots of problems 
came up because of the authority’s lack of objective 
estimation of the actual productive forces and 
consideration on the interests of various stratums within 
the rural areas, which led to the later 
“cooperative-withdrawal storm”. Around autumn 
harvest of 1956, cooperative-withdrawal happened in 8 
provinces including Liaoning, Anhui, Jiangxi, Sichuan, 
Henan and so on. In Ningbo, Zhejiang province, those 
who withdrew from the advanced cooperative occupied 
5% of the total cooperative member households; with 
20% more households had the intension of withdrawing 
from the advanced cooperative. Among the 302 
cooperatives in Xianju county, Zhejiang province, 116 
cooperatives were completely disintegrated; 55 were 
partly broken down; the number of 
cooperative-participated households declined from 91% 
to 19%. The cooperative-withdrawal phenomena also 
happened in some areas of 12 counties in Henan 
province. In May 1957, within one of the most seriously 
cooperative-withdrawal affected counties in Jiangsu 
province, Tai county, collective cooperative 
-withdrawal happened in 62% townships and 46% 
advanced cooperatives. (Lin，Yunhui, p.211-213） 
The primary reasons for the cooperative -withdrawal 
were as follows: (Lin，Yunhui, p.214-216） 
First, after the transformation to the advanced 
agricultural producers’ cooperative, land reward was 
abolished and the peasants’ income was generally 
balanced. However, the incomes of the rich-middle 
peasants, who were previously in high level; and the 
poor households, who were lack of work force, were 
obviously reduced. In the economic crops areas, the 
rich-middle peasants occupied about 15% to 20% of the 
total rural households. They were in high production 
and income level before they joined the advanced 
cooperative because of their advantage of “two 
strengths and three goodnesses” (strong labor force, 
strong funds, good techniques, good possession and 
good planning). After they joined the advanced 
cooperative, the distribution relation was changed and 
their advantages were lost. Their interests were harmed, 
so they stoutly asked to withdraw from the cooperative. 
Second, during the transformation from the 
elementary agricultural producers’ cooperative to the 
advanced cooperative, the cooperative members’ 
scattered trees, fruit trees and reed ponds were all 
expropriated by the advanced cooperative, which led to 
intense dissatisfaction within the rural households. Also, 
the prices of the members’ farm animals, farm tools and 
fruit trees were not reasonably converted and paid to 
their previous owners as scheduled, which led to interest 
loss of the members, especially some rich-middle 
peasants. They suffered most from the transformation, 
thus they decided to withdraw from the advanced 
cooperative. 
Third, because of the different producing conditions 
among various brigades and teams, the incomes were 
also different. The rich villages, brigades or teams were 
strongly dissatisfied with the forceful expropriation of 
their extra lands, foodstuff, live stocks and farm tools. 
Therefore, the peasants in such villages, brigades or 
teams asked to break up or withdraw from the 
cooperative. According to the statistic of Ru County in 
Henan province, peasants of 17 cooperatives struggled 
to break up or withdraw from the cooperative, which 
occupied 48.5% of the total advanced agricultural 
producers’ cooperative of this county. (Lin，Yunhui, 
p.215） 
Fourth, the advanced cooperative disobeyed the 
usual natural pattern and forcefully changed the regular 
farming law, which led to output reduction. According 
to a certain village in Hebei province, the farming 
tradition was to plant wheat in spring and corn in 
autumn. However, after the transformation to the 
advanced cooperative, the knee-high corn was 
destroyed and sweat potatoes were planted. By then, the 
proper time to plant sweat potatoes had already passed. 
The anti-natural discipline actions led to extremely poor 
harvest that year.  
 Fifth, the level management in the advanced 
cooperative was rather backward. The producing plan 
was extremely unreasonable, the labor management was 
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in chaos, the accounts were in a mess and the work 
division was unbalanced, which led to income reduction 
of the peasants, especially the rich-middle peasants. So 
they asked to withdraw from the advanced cooperative. 
3.3.3.4 Policy Adjustment 
Aimed at the cooperative-withdrawal storm, the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China and the 
State Department issued a series of policy documents to 
adjust the temporal conditions. The primary contents of 
these documents were as follows:  
First, with respect to the means of production, part 
of them, such as fish ponds, orchards and trees could be 
temporarily managed by their original owners without 
being expropriated by the advanced cooperative. The 
cooperative members were allowed to raise a certain 
amount of large farm animals and the cooperatives must 
pay rents to the owners if they use the members’ farm 
animals. A certain amount of lands were distributed to 
the members to plant vegetables. 
Second, with respect to management method, the 
previous way of stereotyped management was replaced. 
Large-scale, small-scale or individual management 
were all allowed especially in sideline production. 
Third, with respect to producing management, 
collective laboring was no longer advocated. Production 
teams were allowed to make job contracts, output 
contracts and finance contracts. Also they were allowed 
to carry out the system of production quota 
overfullfillment encouragement. Work and power were 
divided between advanced cooperative and production 
teams. The rule “production contract was made within 
the production team; job contract was made within the 
group; and field management contract was made within 
the household” was implemented. The household was 
able to make farm work contract, but it couldn’t be the 
unit of producing contract. 
Forth, with respect to distribution system, work 
division was practiced and workpoint system was 
carried out. Some work could be contracted with 
individual members and profits was divided pro rata. 
Some work was allowed to be managed individually, 
assuming sole responsibility for his profits or losses and 
the cooperative only took away certain amount of the 
accumulation fund or public welfare fund. 
Fiftn, the cooperative members were able to manage 
family sidelines as long as this didn’t affect the 
cooperative’s production. Also, the members had the 
freedom to withdraw from the cooperative. 
3.3.3.5 Effects of the Policy Adjustment  
The various policies above didn’t fundamentally solve 
the advanced cooperative’s malady of centralized 
management. Also，the cooperative members’ work was 
not properly connected with their gains of production 
and distribution. The distribution problem that harmed 
the peasants’ interest was not completely solved, which 
led to dissatisfaction among the peasants. In some areas, 
such as Yongjia in Zhejiang province and Yancheng in 
Jiangsu province, peasants spontaneously implemented 
“fixing of farm output quotas for each household”, 
which was to make job contracts with production 
groups or households on the basis of making job or 
output contracts with production teams. The “fixing of 
farm output quotas for each household” achieved good 
results. The responsibility with such management was 
clear and definite, thus the producing quality was 
improved. The way of management was simple, thus the 
fussy work of allocation and accounting by the 
cooperative or team cadres was unnecessary. The 
cooperative members could plan and manage the 
production themselves, which effectively combined 
collective management with family management. The 
labor reward was tightly connected with labor amount 
people afforded, which conquered equalitarianism to a 
large degree and was welcomed by the peasants. 
    However, the method of “fixing of farm output 
quotas for each household” aroused controversy. Some 
people thought that socialistic rural economy should 
only be collectively managed instead of dispersively 
managed. Collective management was socialistic, while 
dispersive management was “work on one’s own”, 
which was a reflection of small-scale peasant economy 
and was not socialistic. (Liu, Yong, p.44-45) While the 
other people argued that “fixing of farm output quotas 
for each household” was a beneficial exploration to 
cooperative system and that during temporal period of 
hand laboring and live stock farming, “large-scale 
management wouldn’t bring many benefits”. (Liu, Yong, 
p.46-47) As a result of this controversy, those who were 
against “fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household” won out. “Fixing of farm output quotas for 
each household” and “work on one’s own” was 
regarded as leading to the capitalistic direction, which 
was called a guideline mistake and was suppressed 
finally.  
3.3.3.6 Analysis and Evaluation on the 
Agricultural Cooperation Policy 
The agricultural cooperation movement in the 1950s 
was the second systematic transformation of the 
Chinese rural society after the land reform. The 
essential of this movement was the thorough 
transformation of property right relationship—— to 
change the land and primary means of production from 
the peasant’s ownership to the collective ownership. 
The transformation of property right consequently 
brought up changes of management and distribution 
system. As a result, the peasant’s interests were harmed 
and their producing enthusiasm was plastered. 
However, such kind of land ownership 
transformation was historically destined to happen in 
China. The agricultural cooperation policy in the 1950s 
was the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological choice. 
Since it was the Chinese Communist Party’s target to 
realize socialism in China, individual rural economy 
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was rectified to lead for a collective way. Ideological 
factors made the Chinese Communist Party come up 
with “left-leading” ideas in her policy-making. She 
denied that private land ownership after the land reform 
could promote the development of productive forces. 
Instead of regarding the peasant’s land ownership as a 
new economic growth point and giving it protection, she 
destroyed it factitiously within a short time, which 
seriously went against the wills of the peasants. 
The agricultural cooperation policy in the 1950s 
came out as a countermeasure to the “polarization” 
phenomena after the rural land reform. However, the 
temporal rural condition was that the rich-middle 
peasants were “not that rich actually. Compared with the 
poor peasants, their lands were a little bit more fertile; 
they’ve got a little bit more farm animals and farm tools; 
and they’ve got a little bit more opportunities to earn 
money. Their being a little bit richer was a result of their 
hard work.” (Bo, Yibo, p.362) The poor peasants’ 
transformation into low-middle and rich-middle 
peasants through hard work was a progress and was the 
result of rural economic development. However, such 
development was regarded as a potential trend of 
“polarization”. The tendency and harmness of social 
polarization were magnified. When the rich-becoming 
peasants asked to protect their own interests during the 
process of cooperative participation and cooperative 
combination, they were attacked as “anti-agricultural 
cooperation” and having “capitalistic spontaneity”. 
The implementation of the agricultural cooperation 
policy was a reflection of the Chinese authority’s 
mistaken adjustment on rural producing conditions. 
After the land reform, the level of Chinese rural 
productive forces was still very low. The unsubstantial 
industrial basis seriously checked the development of 
productive forces in the rural areas. Under such 
circumstances, simple laboring cooperation and gradual 
enhancement of rural productive forces would be in 
better accordance with the actual conditions. The 
implementation of agricultural cooperation policy and 
the increasingly fastened step to realize cooperation 
made the development of production relationship go 
against the development of productive forces and the 
peasants’ free wills. It hampered further development of 
rural productive forces. 
The agricultural cooperation policy in the 1950s was 
a political measure to a large extent. The leaders in 
power regarded controversies within the communist 
party and the peasants’ dissatisfaction with cooperation 
as the class struggle antagonism between socialism and 
capitalism. They mechanically used the concepts of 
class struggle to explain these phenomena and made 
economic problems politicalized. Furthermore, they 
carried out economic policies with political forces. Mao 
Zedong’s personal ideas took sovereign position during 
this process.  
The agricultural cooperation policies after the 1950s 
reflected the age-long equalitarian ideology of “equal 
the noble and humble; average the rich and poor”. It 
reflected the trend of “partnership and equal output”. 
Such kind of trend was awarded the “laurel” of 
“socialism”, and was practiced in the form of 
governmental policy and system. 
 
4.  PEOPLE’S COMMUNE PERIOD           
（1958—1978） 
 
In 1958, the Chinese rural areas stepped from the 
agricultural cooperation period into the people’s 
commune period. 
 
4.1 Background of the Policy in the 
People’s Commune Period 
4.1.1 Influence of the International Communist 
Movement 
The left-leaning ideological trend of the international 
communist movement was the international background 
of China’s “people’s commune” movement. 
The hasty longing for the early coming of 
communism was always a problem in the communist 
movements. (Bo, yibo, p.768) In the 1920s, Lenin once 
tried to transfer the Soviet Union which was still 
small-scale peasant economy directly into communism. 
Stalin also made claims every now and then during the 
Soviet Union’s economic construction period that 
socialism would be completed soon and that people 
should be ready to transfer into the communist period. 
In 1958，Khrushchev claimed that the Soviet Union 
should catch up with and overpass the United State 
within 15 years from then on, and that Communism 
should be realized within 12 years starting from 1959. 
The ideology of Soviet Union who was then “the 
leading goat of socialism” had prodigious influence on 
the other socialistic countries. On the Moscow 
conference with 64 communist parties and labor parties’ 
representatives being presented in 1957, Mao Zedong 
claimed that China would catch up and surpass the 
United Kingdom in steel and other primary industrial 
production output within 15 years, (Bo, yibo, p.691) 
which made the thought of “running into communism” 
overflowed in China. 
4.1.2 The Result of the Expansion of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s “Left-Leaning” 
Thought 
The people’s commune was the result of the rapid 
expansion of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
“left-leaning” ideology under the leadership of Mao 
Zedong. In the 1950s, some of the Chinese leaders, with 
Mao Zedong as their representative, thought that the 
advantage of socialism was that it could better promote 
the development of productive forces. The larger the 
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scale of public ownership, the better it could promote 
the development of productive forces. The ownership 
by the whole people was the most advantageous form of 
public ownership; while the collective ownership was 
the basic form of public ownership. Basic form of 
public ownership was doomed to transfer into the most 
advantageous form. In 1955, Mao Zedong mentioned in 
the comments of his book Socialistic Climax in Chinese 
rural areas, “small-scale cooperatives were lack of 
manpower, lands and funds, thus they couldn’t use 
machines to implement large-scale management. Such 
kind of small cooperatives were bondages to the 
development of productive forces, so that they shouldn’t 
be maintained for long and should be incorporated 
gradually.” (Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, p.257) Also, Mao 
criticized those who were “anti-rash advance” were 
“right-leaning”. During the later period of the 
agricultural cooperation movement, the “left-leaning” 
thought within the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China was more and more serious. 
These ideologies and theories led to the people’s 
commune movement within the Chinese rural areas in 
1958. 
4.1.3 The Result of the “Great Leap Forward” 
Movement 
The people’s commune was the result of the “Great 
Leap Forward” movement that happened in the late 
1950s in China. In the late 1950s, China carried out the 
“overtaking Great Britain and the United States” 
strategy and launched the “Great Leap Forward” 
movement. In the aspect of the agricultural field, the 
“Great Leap Forward” movement mainly behaved as 
constructing irrigation and water conservancy. The 
construction of irrigation and water conservancy 
required uniform planning of lands, large quantities of 
labor forces and funds for large-scale projects. Also, 
cooperation and coordination of cooperatives, villages, 
townships, districts or even counties were required. 
Thus the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China adjusted the scale of agricultural cooperatives 
and division of administrative districts to settle these 
problems. The “leap forward” movement of 
constructing irrigation and water conservancy 
“stimulated the idealistic sparkles of Mao Zedong and 
other central leaders to change the organic structure at 
the grass-roots level of the rural areas.” (Bo, Yibo, 
p.728) 
 
4.2 Policy Contents and Results of the Early 
People’s Commune Period 
4.2.1 Policy Contents 
The characters of the early people’s commune period 
were “one large, two collectivizations and three 
transformations” and “integration of government 
administration with commune management”. 
The “one large” had two reflections. First, the scale 
of people’s commune was larger than the previous 
agricultural producers’ cooperative. It was established 
with township as its basic unit. Usually there was one 
commune per township. Second, the management range 
of the people’s commune was larger than the 
agricultural producers’ cooperative. The people’s 
commune was a grass-roots unit which made 
comprehensive management of farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry, side-line production and fishery. 
Also, it uniformly administrated workers, peasants, 
businessmen, students and soldiers. The “two 
collectivizations” referred to the expropriation of the 
commune members’ means of production and part of 
their means of livelihood. Except a few living 
appliances, the commune members should hand in all of 
their private plots; fowls; livestocks and family 
sidelines to the people’s commune. Private ownership 
of means of production was completely eliminated. The 
“three transformations” referred to organized 
militarization, action for battle readiness, and 
collectivization of lifestyle. All the commune members 
from 18 to 25 age-old were organized under military 
system and joined in “battles” by corps under the unitive 
guidance of the people’s commune. The supply system 
was put into practice. Public dinning halls were set up. 
The distribution system was the combination of salary 
and foodstuff supply. The “integration of government 
administration with commune management” referred to 
the combination of people’s commune with basic rural 
regime. The people’s commune was established with 
the township as its basic unit. Every township had one 
people’s commune. Township and people’s commune 
were integrated. The people’s commune was not only an 
economic organization, but also the grass-roots unit of 
the national regime. 
4.2.2 Result and Analysis of the Policy 
4.2.2.1 Stirring up the “Wind of Public 
Ownership” 
The people’s commune’s early policy of “one large, two 
collectivizations and three transformations” and 
“integration of government administration with 
commune management” resulted in many abuses. The 
worst one was the “wind of public ownership” (Central 
Committee’s Documents Research Institute, Vol.5, 
p.130) During the establishing process of the people’s 
commune, over decades of, or even more cooperatives 
which had different managing patterns, economic 
conditions and income levels were combined together. 
Unitive accounting was carried out. Poor cooperatives 
and rich ones shared common property. The previous 
rich cooperatives suffered losses. The commune 
members’ income reduced obviously, which hurt their 
producing enthusiasm seriously. The previous poor and 
laggard cooperatives could share other cooperatives’ 
means of production so they gained benefits due to the 
combination of cooperatives. They mistakenly thought 
that as long as the extent of public ownership was raised, 
their living standard would be enhanced. 
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During the people’s commune period, all the means 
of production like lands, work force and part of the 
means of livelihood belonged to the commune. The 
people’s commune could allocate and transfer them 
arbitrarily. Even national departments which were 
above county level could allocate and transfer the 
commune’s property. According to the Central Rural 
Department’s report in August 1961, within the past few 
years, 25 billion yuan of property were indiscriminately 
transferred from the peasants and rural collective 
organizations. On average, about 48.89 yuan was 
indiscriminately transferred from each peasant.  
Meanwhile, the average annual expenditure of peasants 
at that time was only 68 yuan per year. (Bo, Yibo, p.765) 
The free and equalitarian transformation of rural 
materials and work forces severely harmed the 
producing and living conditions of the peasants.  
During the early times of the people’s commune 
period, the commune members’ private plots; poultry; 
farm animals; self-supporting flaky fruit trees and some 
large farm tools were all expropriated. Even some of the 
peasants’ means of livelihood, such as houses; clothes; 
quilts and furnitures were arbitrarily transferred. Family 
sidelines and small pedlars were banned for the reason 
of eliminating bourgeois private ownership of means of 
production, which seriously harmed the peasants’ 
interests. The combined distribution system of income 
and foodstuff supply during the early people’s 
commune period made equalitarianism prevail in the 
rural areas. Public dinning hall system was carried out, 
which made public finance defalcate. The commune 
members’ producing enthusiasm and working efficiency 
declined generally. The system of integration of 
government administration with commune management 
was carried out. The people’s commune intervened in 
the economic affairs of the villages and brigades by 
administrative orders. The villages and brigades were 
forced to execute orders from superior levels. In such 
conditions, the peasants choked with silent fury. 
The people’s commune movement resulted in the 
phenomena of free appropriation of others’ laboring 
harvest to a large extent. In the “wind of public 
ownership” deluged areas, the dissatisfied peasants 
began to slaughter batches of farm animals; poultry; 
livestocks and destroyed their farm tools. Large 
numbers of work forces fled to other places. Lands were 
extensively cultivated and vast amount of lands were 
laid waste. The output of foodstuff became less and less. 
The peasants lived in privation and innutrition. Diseases 
prevailed in large scale in the rural areas.  
4.2.2.2 Proneness to “Boasting and 
exaggeration” 
Another abuse of the early people’s commune period 
was the proneness to “boasting and exaggeration”. In 
order to “surpass Britain and the United States” within a 
couple of decades of years, the central government not 
only made high production target for industrial 
materials; but also sky-high output plan for foodstuff 
and other farm produces. Faced with the tremendous 
political pressure from the higher-up, the magistrates 
had no way but to ingratiate higher authorities and 
bodies and make false reports on foodstuff output. 
Overrated production value led to the government’s 
higher requisition by purchase, which led to excessive 
foodstuff buying by the state. In 1959 and 1960, the rate 
of state monopoly purchase for foodstuff increased 
rapidly to 39.7% and 35.6% of the total output 
respectively. However, the actual total foodstuff output 
had been declined rapidly. In 1959, the total output of 
foodstuff was 340 billion jin (1 jin = 0.5 kilogram), 
which was 60 billion jin less than it was in 1958. In 
1960, the total foodstuff output was 53 billion jin less 
than it was in 1959. The cotton output was 39.375 
million dan (1 dan = 100 jin = 50 kilogram) in 1958. 
It declined to 34.176 million dan in 1959 and further 
declined to 21.258 million dan in 1960. The output of 
oil crops in 1960 was hardly half of it was in 1957. (Wei, 
Zhenming, 1988) The vast requisition by purchase 
under the condition of rapid reduction of foodstuff 
output stimulated panic and dissatisfaction among the 
peasants. The evil consequences of upgrading the 
people’s commune came up gradually. 
4.2.2.3 Policy Adjustment and Result of the 
Policy in the People’s Commune Period 
The excessive actions in the early people’s commune 
period brought lots of bad results. Thus the central 
committee began to make policy adjustments in Nov. 
1958. 
A.   Policy Adjustment and Policy Analysis 
Making Clear Distinctions between Two Social 
Developmental Periods and Two Kinds of Ownership 
In Nov. 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China claimed that the distinctions between 
socialism and communism, the collective ownership 
and the ownership by the whole people should be 
clarified. The present period belonged to socialism, and 
the people’s commune belonged to the collective 
ownership. Both of the two transformations (the 
transformation from socialism to communism and the 
transformation from the collective ownership to the 
ownership by the whole people) needed quite a period 
of time; and could only be finished gradually. (Central 
Committee’s Documents Research Institute, Vol. 11, 
p.598-623) However, the adjustment of policies didn’t 
deal with the problems which were concerned with the 
commune’s ownership. On the Sixth Plenum of the 
Eighth Central Committee, the “Decisions on Some of 
the Problems about the People’s Commune” still 
pointed out that “the production team was the basic unit 
for organizing labor force” and that “the people’s 
commune was in unified charge of profit and loss”. 
(Central Committee’s Documents Research Institute, 
Vol. 11, p.618) Thus the continuous extension of 
“equalitarianism and indiscriminate transfer of 
resources” (Annotation Group of the Central 
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Committee’s Documents Research Institute，1989，p.2) 
and “wind of public ownership” were hardly checked.  
The Establishment of “Three-Level Ownership and 
Production Brigades -Based” System.  
From Feb. to Apr. 1959, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China held meetings to settle the 
problems of the people’s commune’s extra high-level 
ownership; rectify the “equalitarianism and 
indiscriminate transfer of resources” and check the 
“wind of public ownership”. Also, the distinctions 
between the people’s commune ownership, the 
production brigade ownership and the production team 
ownership were claimed to be made clear. The 
production brigade was the basic accounting unit. It was 
the people’s commune ownership, the production team, 
which was below the production brigade, had part of the 
ownership and management purview. The previously 
arbitrarily transferred resources by the people’s 
commune and the labor support between communes or 
brigades were declared to be clearly balanced by 
returning cash or compensating with labor. The 
previously production team-managed enterprises and 
lands which were transferred monopolistically by 
counties or communes were returned or evaluated. 
(Central Committee’s Documents Research Institute, 
Vol.12, p.164-168) 
During the policy adjustment process, there came up 
requests for resuming production team-based ownership, 
fixing of farm output quotas for each household, 
abolishing the supply system and closing down the 
public dinning hall from various local areas. In 1959, 
fixing of work load quotas for each household, fixing of 
farm output quotas for each household and plot 
responsibility system were resumed in some areas. Such 
kind of activities showed the peasants’ strong wills to 
repel the “mess together” and arrange their production 
independently. However, these activities were regarded 
as “furious anti-socialistic road” (Central Committee’s 
Documents Research Institute, Vol.12, p.621) and were 
stopped in the end. The production brigade based 
ownership was changed back into the people’s 
commune ownership. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, famine took place 
in the Chinese rural areas widely. Diseases prevailed 
and the peasants fled from famine. Countless people 
were starved to death. The collective economic 
management was messed up and the financial system 
became laxe. The rural economy was severely 
destroyed. Faced with such kind of situation, the Central 
Committee had to make policy adjustment again. In Nov. 
1960, the “Twelve Rules” (Central Committee’s 
Documents Research Institute, Vol.13, p.660-676) made 
by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China prescribed that: 
(1) The basic system of the people’s commune was 
the production brigade -based three-level ownership 
(three-level refers to the people’s commune, production 
brigade and production team). 
(2) The systems of job contract; production and 
output contract; financial affairs contract and 
overfulfillment encouragement were carried out by the 
production team. The usufruct of labor force, lands, 
farm animals and farm tools belonged to the production 
team. Nobody could transfer them arbitrarily. The 
production team had some producing management 
power, which meant they had the power to cultivate 
lands according to local conditions, set technical 
measures and arrange various farm works under the 
precondition of finishing contract-fixed work first. 
(3) The commune members were allowed to manage 
private plots and small-scale family sidelines. 
(4) Public dinning hall system was insisted. With 
respect to distribution system, distribution according to 
work afforded by the peasants took the principle part. 
Supply system occupied 30% of the total amount of 
distribution. 
In March 1961, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China constituted the “Agricultural 
Sixty Rules” based on the “Twelve Rules”, which 
further affirmed the production brigade-based 
ownership. 
These two documents changed the former 
commune’s ownership back to the production brigade 
ownership, which was still characterized as the 
collective ownership. However, although the 
management method was adjusted and the commune 
members had more self-determination in managing 
private plots and family sidelines, equalitarianism and 
“mess together” were still the predominant ways of 
distribution. 
Establishment of the “Production Team-Based 
Three-Level Ownership” System 
In June 1961, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China further abolished the public dinning hall 
and the supply system. Also, the property right of the 
production teams and the commune members was 
expanded. (Central Committee’s Documents Research 
Institute, Vol.14, p.385-412) In February 1962, the basic 
accounting unit was further transferred from the 
production brigade to the production team. Thus the 
production team gained not only the producing 
management power, but also the distributing decision 
power. (Central Committee’s Documents Research 
Institute, Vol.15, p.176-192) In September 1962, the 
Central Committee issued documents to enlarge the 
production team’s power and establish the production 
team-based ownership. (Central Committee’s 
Documents Research Institute, Vol.15, p.615-647) Also, 
the commune members were allowed to manage a spot 
of private plots and small-scale family sidelines. 
(Central Committee’s Documents Research Institute, 
Vol.15, p.636) The production team-based management 
system did overcome equalitarianism among teams. 
However, the workpoint-based distribution method 
followed the “mess together” system. The “production 
team-based three-level ownership” system was still 
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accompanied with the rural polity of “integration of 
government administration with commune 
management”. 
The Test and its Result of Fixing of Farm Output 
Quotas for Each Household and Some Analysis  
In 1961, “fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household” was spontaneously reemerged in the rural 
areas. The most influential case, which happened in 
Anhui province, was the “land responsibility” system. 
Under such system, the commune members made 
contract with the production team to cultivate lands and 
complete fixed quotas for grain production. If they over 
fulfilled the production quota, they would be generously 
rewarded; but if they couldn’t fulfilled the quotas, they 
would compensate for the entire loss. (Liu, Yong, p.148) 
Gaining support from the Central Committee, this 
system developed very fast. By the end of 1961, 90.1% 
of the production teams in Anhui province established 
the ““land responsibility” system. (Liu, Yong, 
p.151-152) According to a typical survey on 36 counties 
in Anhui province in October 1961, 36 production 
teams which carried out the ““land responsibility” 
system made an average foodstuff increase of 38.9% 
compared with last year. (Liu, Yong, p.151-152) 
The “land responsibility” system gave peasants 
freedom in arranging their own production under the 
collective ownership. It had the intension of 
encouragement in distribution, thus it was warmly 
welcomed by the peasants. However, Mao Zedong 
thought that taking the production team as the basic 
accounting unit was the last boundary. The “fixing of 
farm output quotas for each household” was to resume 
“work on one’s own”, which would lead to capitalistic 
direction. He criticized the “land responsibility” system, 
which behaved under the form of “fixing of farm output 
quotas for each household”. The mass peasants 
supported “fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household”, thus some of them submitted a written 
statement to the higher authority and explained the 
benefits of separate management such as “fixing of farm 
output quotas for each household” and “land 
responsibility” system. (Liu, Yong, p.161-164) The 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
faced with much resistance in criticizing and rectifying 
the system of “fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household”. (Liu, Yong, p.159) 
At the same time, divergent opinions also appeared 
within the leaders of the Central Committee. Some of 
them, with Liu Shaoqi, Deng Zihui and Deng Xiaoping 
as their representative, supported “fixing of farm output 
quotas for each household”. While Mao Zedong pointed 
out that “fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household” was the collective ownership breaker. 
Whether or not to carry out “fixing of farm output 
quotas for each household” was an issue concerning 
with whether proletariat dictatorship or bourgeoisie 
dictatorship would be carried out; and whether 
socialistic road or capitalistic road would be taken. He 
criticized that those who supported “fixing of farm 
output quotas for each household” were delegates of the 
interests of the rich middle-peasants. They even upheld 
the standpoint of the landlords, rich peasants and 
bourgeoisies and fight against socialism. After this, 
Mao claimed that class struggle should be 
propagandized year by year, month by month and day 
by day. Mao’s attitude was overwhelming in the Central 
Committee’s policy making process. Then all of the 
high leaders in Central Committee leant to Mao’s side 
and abolished “fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household” forcefully. 
The central committee’s rural economic policy and 
systematic design from 1950s to 1970s was the 
ideological choice of the Chinese Communist Party. It 
was in accordance with her insistence in socialistic 
direction and realizing high-level public ownership. The 
rural economic policy and systematic transformation of 
the people’s commune period told us that the 
government fastened its step in substituting public 
ownership for private ownership in a wider scope and 
finally replaced private ownership  
4.2.3 Chinese Rural Policy from the “Cultural 
Revolution” Period to the Pre-Reforming 
Period 
After the 1960s, the class struggle theory further 
upgraded and the “left-leaning” thought swelled 
dramatically. Team combination, production 
brigade-based accounting and joint brigades accounting 
prevailed in various local areas. In 1966, “the Culture 
Revolution” broke out and the “left-leaning” line went 
to its utmost. The Central Committee again emphasized 
that productive forces should be promoted by high-level 
public ownership. In the “learning from Da Zhai” 
movement, it was again emphasized that production 
brigade should be the basic accounting unit. In October 
1975, Hua Guofeng, who was then the vice prime 
minister, emphasized in the national agricultural 
conference of learning from Dazhai: “When the 
condition is permitted, we will transfer to the production 
brigade ownership, or even people’s commune 
ownership. The production brigade or  people’s 
commune were also the basic accounting unit. In the 
further future, the people’s commune will transfer from 
the collective ownership to the ownership by the whole 
people, and then from the socialistic ownership by the 
whole people to the communist ownership by the whole 
people.” (Hua, Guofeng, 1975, p.20) In February 1977, 
the Central Committee declared that “basic accounting 
unit be transferred from the production team to the 
production brigade” in order to “further carry out the 
superiority of the people’s commune’s ‘one large and 
two collectivizations”. The “left-leaning” trend went to 
its utmost during the Cultural Revolution.  
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4.3The Result and Evaluation on the Policy 
in the People’s Commune Period 
The rural land policy and system arrangement during 
the people’s commune period resulted in various 
economic and political problems 
4.3.1 Economic Aspect 
4.3.1.1 Industrial Development Seized Interests 
from Agricultural Development 
From 1949 to 1978, the pattern of China’s economic 
development was to realize original capital 
accumulation by sacrificing the interests of the peasants. 
The industrial development was based on system 
protection of the agricultural producers’ cooperative and 
people’s commune. Under the system arrangement of 
agricultural producers’ cooperative and people’s 
commune, agricultural profits were “deprived” in order 
to gain funds, raw materials and work forces required by 
national industrialization. During the people’s 
commune period, the rural areas offered 540 billion 
yuan to the industrial development, which was 21 
billion yuan each year. Each rural labor force offered 
about 80 yuan to the state on average every year. (See 
Table 6) (Xin, Yi, 2001) 
4.3.1.2 Stagnation of Rural Economy 
During the people’s commune period, “increase without 
development” (Huang, Zongzhi, 2000, p.77) was the 
irregular characteristic of the Chinese rural areas. The 
peasant’s income was low and the rural laboring 
productivity was in stagnant condition for a long time. 
During the people’s commune period, the conflict 
between population increase and people’s demand for 
lands became more and more serious because of the 
growing population. From 1958 to 1982, China’s 
population increased from 0.66 billion to 1.02 billion, 
which grew by 55%. In the corresponding period, the 
rural population increased from 0.553 billion to 0.804 
billion, which grew by 45%. However, the cultivated 
area had little increase, with the crop planting area 
slightly reduced. In 1958, the total planting area of 
China was 2.28 billion mu, which reduced to 2.17 
billion mu in 1982. In the corresponding period, the 
total foodstuff planting area reduced from 1.914 billion 
mu to 1.702 billion mu, which was reduced by almost 
12%. The sharp increase of population and reduction of 
planting area resulted in reduced amount of average 
cultivated area per person from 3.45 mu to 2.14 mu, 
which declined by 38%. (See Table 7) ( Program 
Department of the Agriculture Ministry of the People’s 
Republic of China, 1989，p.130-131) According to the 
general economic developmental rule in most countries, 
one of the primary approaches to settle such kind of 
problem was to transfer mass surplus work forces to 
other industries. However, the people’s commune 
system tied almost all of the surplus rural work forces 
tightly to the rural lands. Hundreds of millions of rural 
population were strictly controlled and population 
flowage was forbidden. 
During this period, planting industry played a 
primary role in agricultural production; and foodstuff 
planting played a primary role in planting industry. The 
thick rural labor force and rigid producing way made 
laboring productivity stagnant or even declined year by 
year. During the period after the mid 1960s, the daily 
output of primary farm produces kept nearly the same 
amount for more than 10 years, with some of them even 
reduced. (See table 8) The low rural laboring 
productivity made the peasants’ living standard remain 
stagnated for a long term. From 1957 to 1977, the 
Chinese peasants’ average annual income increased 
from 40.5 yuan to 64.98 yuan, with each person earning 
1.2 yuan more each year. In the corresponding period, 
the average foodstuff amount each peasant processed 
increased only 0.5 kg per year. (Xin, Yi)) 
The people’s commune system seriously suppressed 
the peasants’ enthusiasm to work independently and 
actively. Its management system was integration of 
government administration with commune management; 
its distribution system was equalitarianism without any 
encouraging mechanism; its bulk purchase and 
marketing of farm products was monopolistic; its 
management system for producing and laboring was 
over centralized. The rights of peasants’ job-choosing 
and migration were deprived. All of these severely 
suffocated the producing initiative of the grass-roots 
units and peasants. The people’s commune system 
disturbed efficient arrangement of producing factors 
and made dramatic negative influence on rural 
economic development. During the people’s 
commune’s 20 year-long period, poverty and laggard 
were the primary character of Chinese rural society. 
4.3.2 Political and Administrative Aspect 
4.3.2.1 Administrative Power Was Highly 
Centralized 
During the people’s commune period, “integration of 
government administration with commune 
management” was practiced. The people’s commune 
processed highly centralized power. Its leading was 
consolidated and its management was classified. The 
commune management committee exerted 
administrative power. It assigned production tasks by 
administrative means and push forward various rural 
systems. Basic party organizations had the power to 
allocate public properties. The commune’s party 
committee and the production brigade’s party branch 
became the actual power holders. The omnipotent and 
embracive “integration of government administration 
with commune management” system reflected serious 
defect and obstruction of the structure and function of 
the people’s commune. It couldn’t accommodate with 
the demands of rural development and realize efficient 
governance over rural areas.  
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4.3.2.2 Strict Control over Individual Peasants 
During the people’s commune period, individual 
peasants were organized by the people’s commune and 
were controlled economically, politically and 
ideologically. 
First of all, the peasant’s economic lives were 
controlled. The peasants’ economic lives went on with 
production teams as their basic units. The production 
team became the main channel for the peasants’ to gain 
their means of livelihood. The production team, 
production brigade and people’s commune controlled 
the peasants by making strict laboring disciplines. 
Secondly, the peasants’ political lives were controlled. 
Besides economic control over the peasants’ lives, 
ideological ideas were indoctrinated into the peasants’ 
minds in order to realize political control over the 
peasants. During the people’s commune period, 
production team and production brigade were not only 
producing units but also political organizations. The 
commune, production brigade and production team 
indoctrinated collectivistic ideas to their members to 
insure that the collective activities could go on smoothly. 
In order to maintain normal operation of the commune 
system, those who were against rules were not only 
charged with economic punishment, but also punished 
by political means such as being denounced and 
criticized at a public meeting. 
4.3.2.3 General Evaluation 
The people’s commune was the development and 
continuation of the agricultural cooperation policy. 
During this period, rural land policy and systematic 
arrangement was characterized as strong enforcement. 
The essential of the economic and political systems of 
the people’s commune was to further emphasize public 
ownership of property right and enhance the level of 
property right adscription. The highly collectivized and 
planned management way of the people’s commune 
deprived the individual peasants’ own initiative rights 
artificially, which made the peasants’ lose their 
producing freedom thoroughly. The extremely 
equalitarian distribution system harmed the peasant’s 
interests and seriously contused their producing 
enthusiasm, which resulted in low producing efficiency. 
Highly centralized political and economic systems 
bound up the peasants extensively and strictly. The 
peasants were fettered to the land and were forbidden to 
do anything other than farming, which resulted in 
congested rural labor force and laggard productivity. All 
of these led to long-term cachexia of rural economy. 
From the perspective of social development, such 
extremely rigid political and economic systems 
disturbed normal differentiation of rural society and 
moderate flow of rural population, which resulted in 
sluggish transformation of rural classes and laggard 
economic development. This further led to sharpened 
disparity and separation between cities and rural areas. 
 
5. THE CONCLUTION 
 
From 1950 to 1978, the development of Chinese rural 
areas underwent a devious journey. The national-made 
land policy was generally reflected as realizing rural 
systematic transformation by forceful methods. Firstly 
the landlord’s land ownership was changed to the 
peasant’s land ownership; then private property right 
was transferred into public property right. At the same 
time, the objective of “whoever cultivates possesses his 
own land”, which was realized in the land reform period 
was substituted by “partnership and equal output” in the 
agricultural cooperation period and was finally changed 
into “one large and two collectivizations” in the 
people’s commune period. Of all the economic 
systematic changes, political factor took the 
predominant position, thus it became the main cause of 
the transformations. The violent systematic changes 
within short periods came against the objective law of 
economic development. Also they were against the 
peasants’ interests. Such kind of policy guide line and 
its consequent systematic changes brought up lots of 
bad results, which caused slow economic development 
and terrible rural living conditions of the peasants for a 
long time. 
The development of the rural areas from 1950 to 
1978 taught us some lessons: first, economic 
development must be in accordance with objective law. 
Instead of running against its social reality and 
economic developmental rules, the government’s policy 
guide line must conform to them. Once the 
government’s political and policy guide line goes 
against the objective law, the economic development 
policy will be inappropriately mastered by ideology, and 
it will lead to harmful, even odious results in 
consequence.  
Second, history tells us the economic development 
model of Chinese rural areas should be established on 
the basis of the peasants’ willingness. It should be the 
choice of the peasants themselves. The peasants are the 
principal part of rural economic development, so they 
should have the right to choose their own 
developmental ways, instead of letting the government 
interfere rural economic development forcefully with 
administrative orders. The continuous spontaneous 
phenomena of “fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household” in the rural areas during the people’s 
commune period reflect the peasants’ strong wishes to 
develop independently. 
These facts demonstrate that the laborers’ producing 
activity play a decisive role in the rural economic 
development. The land system, management system 
and distribution system should all be based upon the 
rule of satisfying the peasants’ basic interests. Only in 
this way could the peasants’ producing enthusiasm be 
mobilized and the rural productivity be raised. The 
political and economic organizing form of “integration 
of government administration with commune 
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management”during people’s commune period was not 
able to realize the peasants’ interests. The equalitarian 
distribution method further harmed the peasants’ 
interests and led to inefficient production in the rural 
areas, which finally caused poor rural producing level 
and long-term low peasant incomes. 
After the “Cultural Revolution” in 1976, the Chinese 
Communist Party turned over to think on the Chinese 
rural developmental conditions and the previous rural 
land policies. She summarized past lessons, made an 
ideological adjustment and rectified her policy radically. 
Accompanied with the political and economic 
reformation in China, the rural land policy also took a 
fundamental change. The Chinese rural political and 
economic development stepped into a brand new 
period. 
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